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A consistent thread weaves through all the articles in this edition. Each author, in 
some fashion, reflects upon the dual concepts of a ‘global green public sphere’ and 
the ‘global governance state’, as they intersect with the politics of environmentalism. 
Indeed, as is evidenced in the preceding pages, the politics of green concern transmute 
into a myriad of different collective forms. Despite this diversity of responses found 
within and between environmental groups, we conclude that most greens cross 
boundaries in a positive fashion. Through the construction of transnational networks 
of solidarity, movements become global entities, acting in concert to protect 
ecosystems and emancipate humans and non-humans from degradation and 
subjugation and expanding the public sphere of green debate transnationally. In 
certain instances, however, environmentalism, is used as a tool for continued conquest 
and domination. These instances, though not generally reflective of green movements 
as a whole, are often writ large due to the relative power, in comparative terms, of the 
proponents. ‘Environment’, therefore can be either a symbol for liberation or 
repression; emancipation or conditionality. It can be used to support democracy or, 
alternatively, to support authoritarianism; it can be used to attack neoliberalism and 
corporate-controlled globalisation, and it can be used to support it; it can be used to 
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lionise concepts of ‘the local’, and it can be utilised to denigrate local systems of 




There may be some intrinsic characteristics of environmental movements which allow 
them to range so freely across and within traditional geopolitical divisions. First, as 
Duffy argues in this collection, ‘Since environmental problems are often 
transboundary, they have become an important arena for the development of 
transnational networks to manage them (this volume). In this light, it may simply be 
that environmental ills determine, to an extent, that transboundary crossings must be 
made. There is no doubt that there is some truth to this hypothesis. To some extent, 
there may be an ecologically determined imperative which has increasingly pushed 
environmentalists across the globe to work more closely together. As Rootes argues 
(this volume), ‘…there has developed a shared concern, grounded in a more systemic 
analysis of the sources of environmental ills. It would be pointless, Rootes suggests, 
to protect a particular species of bird, if key habitats along the migratory routes were 
destroyed elsewhere.  
 
Whilst accepting that non-human nature possesses some essential properties, it must 
be understood that the ‘environment’ and its management are also concepts that are 
socially constructed. In short, regardless of how essential the ‘environment’ actually 
is, one must also consider the social movement, which shapes and delivers its 
message. (Whatmore 2002) Concepts of environment, then, are far from apolitical; 
rather, they are the exact opposite. As Rootes recognises, of at least equal importance 
is the increased collaboration between environmental non-governmental organisations 
over the decades. Their interplay creates new borders and frontiers leading to new and 
diverse geopolitical alliances, drawn upon political imaginations of a transnational 
character.  
 
This is not to suggest for a moment that social movement environmentalism 
exclusively inhabits the political realms, below, above or around the politics of 
nations. Nor is it to suggest that environmental movements only pursue a politics 
without history. Transnational politics obviously do not occur in a void. Although 
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social movements often break through realist geopolitical boundaries, as aforesaid, 
they are still premised on nation-state assumptions. Post-structuralism and post-
modernity are rooted in structuralism and modernity. As a consequence national 
interpretations of green political space – and the political opportunity structures which 
restrict them - as we have seen in France (Hayes), Hungary (Kerėnyi and Szabó) or 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fagan) are still immensely powerful as they interplay with 
this additional layer of increased transnational influence. 
  
Due to the transnational currency of environmental activism, environmental politics is 
often mentioned in the same breath as the phrase ‘global civil society’ (GCS). The 
universal appeal of environmentalism – in all its guises – coupled with the organic 
characteristics of social movements, have seen environmental NGOs,  and informal 
networks become visible parts of an ever-increasing transnational and globalised third 
sector. Often, all third sector political entities are all thrown into the same, almost 
omnipresent, conceptual basket of civil society; but the component parts of 
environmental social movements are impossibly varied in their contributions to 
transnational politics. In fact, the blurring between concepts of ‘global civil society’ 
and ‘global governance’, as well distinctions between third, private and public sectors 
are increasingly commonplace. This is why we use the term green public sphere to 
denote the sphere of dialogue and debate between different forms of 
environmentalism, based on the arguments of Torgerson (this volume). 
 
The abilities of environmental movements to cross national boundaries leads to a 
multitude of outcomes. First, there are those parts of a green public space which can 
be understood in emancipatory terms, building regional and global networks in a 
manner which increases the power resources of the poor and the environmentally 
degraded. In the following analysis, these transnational players will be referred to as 
emancipatory groups (EGs). These emancipatory groups have a strong social 
movement dimension, as defined in the Introduction to this volume. Often, but not 
always, they construct themselves as separate from any notion of the state whether it 
be national or transnational – including green governance states – and often in rugged 
opposition to what they perceive to be a global neoliberal project. These EGs, often 
through grassroots networking, develop shared techniques, strategies, and repertoires 
of action alongside more localised networks and groups and they celebrate more non-
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institutional forms of organisation.  It is in this manner, that the aforementioned 
national repertoires of resistance are shared and transmuted across borders. These 
organisations see a clear divide between the concepts of a global green public sphere 
and an environmentalised governance state; seeing themselves as part of the former, 
but remaining outside the latter.  
 
Other groups – particularly powerful and well-resourced environmental NGOs – are 
denoted here as part of the environmental governance state (EGS). They position 
themselves as part of the neoliberal project of the global governance state, using 
limited – usually postmaterialist - interpretations of green concerns to continue to 
discipline societies which do not mirror their own constructions of nature, or what, in 
their minds, constitutes a productive and democratic civil society. These large 
transnational organisations, usually based in the North, construct grand narratives and 
systems of meaning, while giving some voice to the local, also often herding diverse 
forms of environmental opposition into one omnipresent story – such as climate 
change – gutting the stories of the local. 
 
Green Public Spheres as spaces for Ecological Emancipation 
 
In his article, Rootes seeks to trace the changes due to globalisation of three British 
organisations: the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
and Greenpeace (GP). As a crucial part of this globalisation process, Rootes sees a 
move away from their traditionally narrow conservation focus by WWF to 
incorporate the sustainable development concerns of ‘the global south’, bringing them 
closer to the political ecology perspectives of groups as FoE Whether of course this is 
a ‘radicalisation’ of goals to reflect those of the South (Rootes, this volume), or 
simply a means to co-opt southern agendas is open to debate; but there is no doubt 
that this broadening of previously narrow conservation objectives is a hallmark of 
transnational environmental politics in an increasingly globalised world. 
 
In some ways the entire form of social movement environmentalism challenges the 
power of nation states in just as dramatic a mode as does the plutocracy of 
transnational corporations, though for different reasons. Although many social 
movement organisations – particularly the formalised component-parts of the broader 
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non-institutionalised movements - are under pressure alongside the state to adopt 
market-based operational structures and agendas, most seem to have escaped the 
homogenising global corporate form. Their, often deliberate, informality, transience 
and translucence have also enabled them to largely escape the cost-benefit equations 
of corporations. As their very structure operates within the ‘black’ economy and 
polity of informal relations, the traditional sticks and carrots of nation states and 
corporations have not been wielded as effectively as they have been upon other social 
units, such as families, communities and subcultures. 
 
The political form of social movements is suited to cross boundaries. Often boundless, 
anarchistic, ambiguous, many-faceted, they lack the defined edges of more 
institutionalised political bodies. For example, whereas governments of nation states 
appear increasingly unable to monitor and trace the activities of transnational 
corporations, social movements, due to their jelly-like structurelessness, seem more 
capable of ‘border osmosis’, of oozing through largely non-institutionalized pores in 
the fabric of frontiers, tracking and contesting the rapidly expanding power of 
transnational capital (Doyle 2005). 
 
Regardless of global or cultural context, one of their defining characteristics is this 
social movement form. This structural form defies and, for the period of specific 
struggle, overrides barriers and borders, like class, religion, established political 
parties and even families, which were previously regarded as inviolate and 
impermeable. Environmental social movements rally and protest on a contextual 
basis. Strange bedfellows appear from the centre as well as from the extremes of the 
traditional left/right political continuum in multifarious situations. Not only this, 
social movement environmentalism strikes new identities, some for a fleeting moment 
but others more lasting. Globally mobile activists possess the ‘cultural capital’ of 
higher education (often inclusive of English language skills), ‘and the social capital 
inherent in their transnational connections and access to resources and knowledge’ 
(Routledge et al this volume). The ability of emancipatory environmental movements 
to drift through barriers can create tremendously broad coalitions of support, which 




Some environmental movements are seen as key antagonists to corporate 
globalisation, constantly attacking neoliberal market strategies and the largely 
ungoverned rampages of transnational corporations. Routledge et al’s article includes 
a detailed analysis of the workings of a global justice network: the People’s Global 
Action Asia (PGA). Its foremost ‘collective visions’ directly attack corporate control, 
and embrace ‘a very clear rejection of capitalism’ and a ‘confrontational attitude, 
since… transnational capital is the only real policy maker’. There are a multitude of 
such groups and NGOs across the South - outside of the funding structures of the 
World Bank and wealthy nation-states - who continue to mobilise in largely 
structuralist fashion against the manoeuvring of global capital. 
 
Of course, structuralist and other more radical responses targeted at the global ‘other’, 
though very apparent in many parts of the neo-colonial South, are not so appropriate 
in other parts of the world. In non-democratic regimes, such as Iran (Doyle and 
Simpson), newly emerging green NGOs provide access to the national political 
process for the first time to younger Iranians eager to communicate their 
dissatisfaction with the all-powerful regime which governs them. This process, 
through far from being revolutionary, is potentially emancipatory, in that it has seen 
the emergence of a green public sphere in Iran, which could in time be a harbinger of 
increasing democracy, ultimately leading to the ultimate overthrow of the ruling 
theocratic regime.  
 
Nor are global resistance strategies dominant in many Northern neoliberal nation-
states (though they are a component part). In parts of Europe, added to their 
repertoire, in given contexts, is their ability to trade on issues which are clearly within 
national, domestic milieu, drawing on nationalistic systems of meaning and 
understanding in order to boost power when appropriate. The articles within this 
volume by Hayes, and Kerėnyi and Szabó provide excellent examples of social 
movement organisations utilising nationalist trump cards when it suits. In the French 
anti-GM protests, for example, rather than bringing the legitimacy of the state into 
question, activists invoked French Republican values, demanding more state 
intervention against the ‘biological imperialism’ of American companies, Pioneer and 
Monsanto (Hayes this volume. In a similar vein, in the Hungarian campaign against 
the building of the NATO facility on Zengő  Hill, nationalist arguments were evoked 
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by local campaigners in order to defend what was seen as a landmark important to 
national culture.  
 
Within this ‘bounded innovation’ of national experience (Hayes), there is, however, 
an increasing body of evidence that campaign repertoires for resistance have strong 
transnational links. Greenpeace helped to introduce new tactics to France by training 
activists in the use of ‘lock-downs’ (in which activists lock on to the site they are 
defending using a plastic tube or other manufactured obstacle to prevent opponents 
from breaking the lock), which had become common in other parts of Europe. In 
2004, a Catholic priest, on the Easter Zengő  pilgrimage, blessed the national flag and 
the mountain - declaring that ‘we are not giving up the mountain’ (Kerėnyi and Szabó 
this volume). This action cannot be fully understood without paying homage to the 
fact that this repertoire, seeking protection through sanctification, had been used 
before, in ways which cross the borders of other cultures, other religions and other 
times. The act of sanctification attaches more value to non-human nature. These 
passive resistance tactics, deriving their strength from within myths and rituals of 
established religions, reverberate with the memory of the Hindu tree-huggers of 
Chipko in the 1960s; later manifesting themselves in Burma with Buddhist monks 
ordaining trees in their attempts to halt the onslaught upon the forest; and now in 
Hungary, with a Catholic blessing atop Zengő Hill. 
 
Of course, even emancipatory groups operating at the transnational level can be 
accused, on occasions, of not going far enough in addressing inequities, and in doing 
so, becoming part of the problem, rather than the solution. Doherty’s research is of 
particular interest here in relation to EGs. By focussing on one international 
environmental NGO, Friends of the Earth International, with groups in 70 countries, 
Doherty addresses the basic issues which create friction between Northern and 
Southern branches in the same confederation. The case of the withdrawal of Acción 
Ecológica (Equador) from the FoEI confederation in 2002 is a case in point. In an 
attempt to address the ‘divided planet’ issue mentioned in the introduction of this 
edition, the European FoE groups were very proud of their concept of ecological 
space which was used to show the gross inequities of consumption patterns between 
North and South. But some Southern groups felt that it did not go far enough, for it 
did not recognise the ecological debts imposed on the South by centuries of colonial 
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exploitation. This failure to address past exploitation patterns and an inability to focus 
on issues of redistributive justice drove a shard of ice into the very heart of the FoE 
confereration which, to its credit, engaged on an intense process of dialogue and 
debate on these issues. These tensions in EGs are constant, as they openly wrestle 
with their capacities to liberate, on the one hand, and to denigrate on the other. These 
moral dilemmas are not so evident in those large green transnational organisations we 
refer to here as the global green governance state. 
 
Green Governance State 
 
In Duffy’s article on transnational environmental management in Madagascar, she 
argues that in the case of the South, increasingly close relationships between states, 
global environmental NGOs, private companies and the World Bank make it more 
appropriate to talk of the production of governance states, rather than the creation of a 
separate global civil society. NGOs like WWF and Conservation International work 
so closely with the interests of transnational capital and nation-states that they often 
become part of the same donor consortiums. In Magagascar, the Donor Consortium is 
comprised of USAID, the German Government, the Japanese Government, The 
French Government, the Swiss Government, Conservation International, WWF, 
Wildlife Conservation Society, and the World Bank. 
 
In this picture, sovereignty is not a delimitation of one geographical space over 
another (nation-states); but is a space ‘formed through a series of practices which are 
defined by an interaction of forces’ (Duffy, this volume), including some powerful 
environmental NGOs. In this model, NGOs are just as much part of sovereign, global 
governance states as national governments. 
 
Fagan’s research on the development of the environment and civil society in post-
conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina tells a similar, though distinct story. Here we see the 
emergence of national level NGOs responding to the ecological conditionalities of 
donor consortiums (including some transnational NGOs) and other manifestations of 
global governance states. Environmental movements have not emerged through any 
‘heroic moments’ in Bosnian politics. Rather new NGOs have emerged in top-down 
fashion, as a direct result of responses to the availability of largely EU funding, with 
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funders ignoring the earlier history of environmentalism under the Yugoslav regime. 
This means that funding is mistakenly directed to the creation of civil society, which 
is interpreted as establishing expertise rather than an independent green public sphere. 
Similar outcomes occurred in Hungary (Kerėnyi and Szabó) where after 1989 aid 
from the United States, and later from the EU, followed a similar agenda of the 
creation of civil society, which had the contradictory result of depoliticising 
environmentalism.   
 
In these cases, environmental concerns rarely reflect the needs and aspirations of local 
people. Associated with the aid and donorship programs are attached conditionalities. 
These conditions for ‘rebuilding societies’ - whether it be after a war, after 
communism, after terrorism, or after colonialism - most usually include a pluralist, 
democratic system of governance, coupled with a neoliberal interpretation of the 
market-place. In this vein, NGOs are constructed as vehicles which can recreate and 
reconfigure societal relationships, replacing and ignoring social systems of the ‘old 
order’. The old, intra-national relationships are constructed as the problem: the West 
or the North (whatever the construction of the polarity) is the solution. This is 
synonomous with ‘the objective of colonial discourse’, as Torgerson would have it. 
According to Homi Bhabba, the objective is ‘to construe the colonised as a population 
of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to 
establish systems of administration and instruction’ (quoted in Torgerson, this 
volume). But, with a lack of continuous funding, one set of top-down NGOs is 
replaced by others better positioned to achieve success under the latest round of 
funding creating an orientation towards external funders and away from representing 
local people. There is no support offered to lasting administrative and social structures 
that would allow citizens to decide and implement appropriate management 
structures, as indigenous networks are shunned. 
 
In a controversial article published in World Watch by Mac Chapin, the funding of 
three of the largest of these environmental governance organisations – WWF, 
Conservation International (CI) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) – was explored 
in some detail (Chapin 2004). Chapin concludes that the funding arrangements of ‘the 
big three’ are intermeshed with the vested interests of transnational capital. This 
funding has made these organisations more dependent on large amounts of cash 
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emanating from other parts of the governance state, leading to strong market 
competition between them. More importantly, this funding regime, has led to the 
decimation of local organisations. He writes: 
 
In dealing with smaller organizations, either they tend to use their sheer heft to 
press their agendas unilaterally or they exclude the smaller groups altogether. A 
common tactic is to create new organizations out of whole cloth in foreign 
countries, implanting local bodies as extensions of themselves (Chapin 2004: 
25). 
 
The dominance of these large organisations is without precedence since the first 
emergence of the modern environmental movements in the 1960s, and its impacts are 
far-reaching. In Hungary, for example, Kerényi and Szabo argue that top-down 
environmental concerns are dominated by the reorganisation of national park 
management, based on a US model of public benefit foundations, rather than 
bureaucratic state administration. This is a long way from the mass mobilisation days 
of the Blue Danube movement which significantly helped to contribute to the velvet 
revolution in Hungary. Only since 2004 and the opening of borders with the EU has a 
new more transnational emancipatory green activism begun to develop, as Hungarian 
radicals are able to draw from repertoires and network ties with emancipatory 
environmental groups in other countries.  
 
Along with a particularly apolitical version of democracy, which sees ENGOs as 
service-providers rather than mass mobilisers and endorsing profit-based, market 
solutions, a particular type of environmentalism is also constructed as a central plank 
of this global sovereign conditionality. It is here that the politics of neo-colonialism 
continues, using environmental concerns as a stick to beat local people into a 
submission. One way in which environmentalism is used as a continued plank of 
imperialism is the narrow, postmaterialist way in which it is defined.. In this vein, 
Duffy takes issue with Conservation International and the Wildlife Conservation 
Society as ‘fortress conservation’ organisations, meaning that they support policies 
that would exclude people from designated wildlife zones in order to protect non-
human nature. This is probably the clearest indicator which separates the earlier 
mentioned emancipatory groups from those who are part of the green governance 
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state. Emancipatory environmentalists argue that only by engaging with the subjective 
voices of the loca, traditional and indigenous peoples can adequate ecological 
management strategies be assembled; whereas organisations like CI prefer the 
guidance of an objective, western science, masking as apolitical and technical what is 
in fact a profoundly ideological position. This postmaterialist ‘fortress’ approach, 
again, sees people as the main environmental degraders, and seeks wilderness parks 
devoid of human imprints: ‘a romanticised view of a stunning wilderness and an aura 
of extraordinary biodiversity’ (Duffy, this volume). The three green NGOs in the 
Madagascar Donor Consortium are all wildlife oriented, though incredibly, they direct 
much national policy-making in Madagascar, both environmental and non-
environmental, including the national poverty reduction strategy. Central to this 
approach are the ‘the debt-for-nature swaps’ and the establishment of wildlife 
corridors. The green voices of the East and the South are deafeningly silent here. 
 
The emergence of this EGS – with its tightly controlled postmaterialist focus - may 
not actually denote trends towards democratic change at all but, rather, the 
construction of a state-controlled civil society, or worse, a hollow construction with 
civil society only marked by the clever use of nomenclature and imitation. In the 
cases of Iran or Burma (Doyle and Simpson) included in this edition, this public 
mobilisation may actually be an indicator of authoritarianism, or even totalitarianism, 
rather than an indicator towards democratic change. Or, alternatively, the emergence 
of these kinds of EGS can be seen as an indicator of free markets taking root in a 
given society. Even in an authoritarian regime such as Iran, the language of corporate 
globalisation is never far away: the reinvigoration of the third or ‘civil society’ sector 
is not really about empowering citizens; but rather, it is seen as a convenient way to 
‘downsize government’ and reduce its direct responsibilities in emvironmental policy-
making. 
 
These environmental governance organisations, with their increasing dominance of 
the green political space, are increasingly building and selling grand environmental 
narratives with global reach. Climate change is the current theme used most often in 
the ecopolitical marketplace. These stories are the songlines of ecological 
conditionality, mapping out the co-ordinates that determine which groups shall be 
included in agenda-setting and decision-making; determining those who will be 
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funded; selecting those who shall be corporatised into the global governance state, 
and relegating those who shall remain on the non-institutionalised outer. Rootes 
writes of the new urgency with which climate change has been embraced, as the story 
of climate has become such a large metanarrative that it almost embraces all elements 
of environmental discourse. He quotes its WWF’s UK Chairman, Christopher Ward 
as follows: 
 
…today, WWF’s work is much wider and more complex. You cannot save the polar 
bear if the Arctic ice cap on which it lives melts away through global arming… WWF 
views climate change as the single greatest threat facing the planet… we have all 
joined the list of endangered species (Rootes, this volume). 
 
Climate change is an important, global problem and despite the existence of factions 
of scientists still denying the problem, it seems one side – the side advocating the role 
of humans in creating global climate change – is now gaining a firm upper hand. The 
ascendancy has been gained by a combination of factors, including: i) the results of 
most forms of scientific experimentation in relation to, for example, the melting of 
ice-caps and rising sea level seem to be pointing this way; and ii) the pro-climate 
position – after an initial period of rejection - is now being championed, more and 
more, by powerful political and business interests at both the national and 
international levels, most particularly in the North (see Matthews and Paterson 2005). 
This recent embrace by parts of the business community, in part, can be linked to the 
ease with which climate change arguments can justify business-as-usual approaches, 
as well as their propensity to be mustered to promote the growth of the nuclear 
industry across the globe. 
 
 Despite this dominant position in the affluent world, many environmentalists in the 
South regard climate change as receiving excessive attention. It is seen as a matter 
endorsed by affluent world, western, science, and then utilised as an environmental 
security issue to control the less affluent from pursuing the very path of development 
which the minority world has pursued without restraint since the industrial revolution. 
In the South, it is widely argued that there are more urgent environmental issues 
pertaining to the atmosphere that  (Doyle and Risely 2007) revolve around issues of 
air pollution and their direct impacts upon human health. These issues are more 
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reminiscent of those which evolved in the North during the 1970s, though in the case 
of the South these issues are exacerbated due to the size and rapidity of 
industrialisation, coupled with a profound lack of environmental and health 
infrastructure. In Friends of the Earth International some southern groups asked 
whether desertification and deforestation received less attention than climate change 
because their effects were mainly in the South. 
 
A critical view of the predominant climate change discourse is that it takes much of 
the politics – the conflict - out of environmental resource issues, providing a polite 
filter between human action and human consequence; taking the direct and 
instrumental power relationships out of the equation. It is no longer people against 
people: the exploiters versus the exploited, or in this case, the polluters versus the 
polluted. Rather, although people are still the initiators, they are cast in a far more 
oblique light, often unwittingly setting off a calamitous, climactic punishment for all. 
A force of nature is, in the end, the nemesis, whereas the initiators, the environmental 
degraders, are in relative safety, at a convenient one-step removed from the atrocities 
inflicted upon the many. Also, by constructing the concept of an environmental ‘day 
of judgment’ for all, all humans (all creation) are cast equally as victims; not 




Under neoliberal regimes, environmentalism is commonly a central plank in the 
construction of a new world order (both in Eastern Europe as well as in the South) 
pursued by networks and consortiums of transnational corporations, financial 
institutions, powerful, Northern green NGOs, and other transnational and national 
elites.  These consortiums discipline populations into accepting conditionalities 
attached to aid and restructuring packages which include neoliberal markets; apolitical 
pluralist governance with its concomitant down-sized bureaucracy; and a particularly 
limited and toothless version of what constitutes environmentalism. In authoritarian 
regimes, it simultaneously denotes a politics of dissent and state authority. 
 
But, of course, transnationalisation in a globalised world is multifarious and 
multidirectional. There is also dramatic evidence that in more recent times, Southern 
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movements are increasingly driving the global green movement agenda, with many 
Northern NGOs taking a subservient role for now. For the flow of history is a mirror 
opposite in the green movements of the minority world. Many movements in the 
North, began as postmaterialist movements, interested in trees, parks and threatened 
species, but are gradually coming to terms with the fact that people are also part of the 
environmental equation, they are not separate from nature. The beginnings of 
environmental justice and democracy movements are evolving in the North. This has 
occurred due largely to the amplified power of Southern movements in the last decade 
or so (Princen and Finger 1994: 8).  
 
It would be vacuous, however, to suggest that power moves equally both ways, like 
the tide, and that in the end some form of global balance will be struck. As there is no 
such thing as a free market, or a free lunch, there is also no such thing as a free 
political space. The amorphousness and structurelessness of social movements 
(alongside their cyberspace equivalent in the supposedly equally structurelessness 
Internet) may ultimately deliver results to the more powerful players.  
 
Currently, however, a study of transnational environmental politics is more a 
celebration of differences than similarities: more evidence of the fact that there are 
many environmental movements across the earth rather than one. Regardless of very 
recent trends which suggest an increasing interplay between environmental 
movements across the world, however, the empirical reality is different. In fact, as is 
evidenced in all of the articles in this edition, profound differences in ideology and 
focus, rather than similarities, define the environmental movement experience 
between North and South, rather than cross-boundary, shared political 
activities/identities. Some environmental organisations – often part of a green 
governance state - will seek to globalise environmentalism through disciplining the 
local into a carefully constructed and restricted version of the global. These 
organisations will become increasingly moneyed, and progressively more powerful, 
and their politics of ecological conditionality, regardless of the honour of their 
intentions, can only be understood within a frame of postcolonialism. The majority of 
environmental movements across the globe, however, will persist in their varied 
attempts at environmental emancipation. In their salutation of diversity, and their 
attempts to resist the all-powerful but understandable urge to overly homogenise 
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opposition, they will continue to forge resilient societal alternatives, emerging from a 
continued respect and reverence for diverse localised experiences within the multitude 
of ecological communities. Torgerson writes: 
 
A green politics for a divided planet depends on an expansion of the green 
public sphere, but such a politics is necessarily a divided politics in the sense 
that it neither anticipates or achieves an undifferentiated unity. The divisions, 
however, do not necessarily spell a lack of connections. A green politics for a 
divided planet, indeed, depends upon interconnected spaces distinguished by 
intimations of, as well as approximations to, commonalities capable – at a 
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